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Abstract 
Purpose –Seeks to  examine changes in the environment in which public policy and 
public management operate and the claim that bureaucracy has been replaced by post-
bureaucracy as a result of these changes. 
Design/methodology/approach –  It proposes reanimated public governance as a 
concept that occupies the space between public administration and restructured public 
governance (including reinvented government and New Public Management (NPM). 
Rather than accepting the existence of post-bureaucracy, per se,  the paper  argues  
that there has been a process of extending  bureaucracy that cuts across public and 
non-public boundaries rather than the development of post-bureaucracy per se.   
Findings – In examining the claims for post-bureaucracy, we are witnessing a discourse 
and practice of continuity rather than difference. The need for economies of scale and 
scope, standardisation  and the existence of indivisibilities in public services suggest that 
public sector reforms and proposals for new governance models establish extended or 
flexible forms of bureaucracy rather than post-bureaucratic organisational forms. 
Attempts to introduce ICT-based services and the need for regulatory agencies to 
oversee the contracts with private and non-profit service providers reinforce these 
findings. 
Research limitations/implications – The arguments in this paper are based on 
marshalling the literature and debates surrounding public sector reform to advance a 
central thesis. It draws on real world examples but does not advance direct empirical 
evidence. There is scope for internationally comparative case-studies of different public 
service functions and discourses and practices in different countries  
Practical implications – Policy makers and managers should treat the clarion call of 
post-bureaucracy as a way of liberating public services from a lack of creativity, 
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innovation and accountability with healthy scepticism. In particular,  the view that public 
sector reforms through post-bureaucratic re-organisation will lead to efficiencies is one to 
be challenged. Reforms in any service driven organisations are not zero-cost and any 
implied operational cost saving should be considered against increased transaction 
costs. 
Originality/value – There have been heroic claims made for post-bureaucracy  in many 
organisations enabled by developments associated with the concepts of information 
society and knowledge society. By locating public sector reforms under the rubric of 
“restructured public governance”  a deeper investigation of the implications for the 
discourses and practices associated with public sector reform is advanced.  
Keywords: Restructured Public Governance; Bureaucracy; Post-bureaucracy; 
Reinvented government;  New Public Management; New Public Governance; Digital-Era 
Governance; Reanimated Public Governance; Trusteeship; Disintermediation; 
Transactions Costs. 
Paper type Conceptual paper 
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Introduction and Background 
In the last twenty-five years, normative assumptions have been held about the 
superiority of markets over public organizations, embedded in the claim that the  “public” 
has failed as an organising set of institutions for managing and operating the delivery of 
services that are deemed to be collectively beneficial to society (conventionally known 
as public services), among the political elites of most countries.  The rise of globalization 
and the apparent  reduced ability of the state to manage national  economies effectively 
is one explanation. The  privatisation of state-owned enterprises and assets  and 
introducing market-type reform in public services, as a result of successive fiscal crises 
,is another. Both these explanations are important in supporting the ideology that the 
market is the only effective means of allocating and managing societal resources.  In 
economic policy, this ideology underpins the structural adjustment programmes of 
international institutions, for example the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank. The ideology underpinning these programmes and institutions is expressed 
in the term ‘Washington Consensus’1. 
  The key question that arises out of these changes is, ‘what is the role of civil 
society, the public domain and public values in a much more private market-ordered 
world? In this environment, the argument in favour of the modernisation or restructuring 
of public services along consumer-orientated lines is a powerful one.  It is most strongly 
associated with the discourse and practice of New Public Management (NPM). The 
advocates of NPM argue that  market-led  reform of   public services:  
1. Produce more transparent budgets from an accounting perspective, with 
performance indicators for outputs and attributing costs to outputs; 
2. Organisations  engage in principal-agent2 relationships consisting of networked 
contracts tied to efficient performance; 
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3. Public service functions become disaggregated  and decentralised  into quasi-
market and/or quasi-contractual arrangements;  
4.  Enable competition between public agencies, firms and non-profit bodies 
through the roles of provider and purchaser; 
5.  Minimise the size of the provider agency, facilitating greater exit and entry in the 
provision of public services so as to maintain an effective market for these 
services 
Central to the language of NPM is that of contracts, consumers, markets and 
quasi-markets. One of its  major principles is that state as purchaser and provider of 
services should be divorced so as to create either internal markets within public 
organisations or to contract out services to  other agencies. This organisational reform 
creates the conditions for quasi-markets (that is, ones that do not allocate resources 
purely on the basis of price between different private individuals).  In this view the 
management and delivery of public services are made  more legitimate and accountable 
to the (local) communities they serve because of the efficiency of the market. If this claim 
is true, what is  the role of civil society in this environment? What form should the 
consequently re-structured public domain take? What is the role of public policy, its 
institutions and delivery agencies?   These are the key questions that this paper 
attempts to address. 
  The public sector in many countries has become subject to these reforms, 
particularly in former Commonwealth countries, the US and the Netherlands. In  a 
number of developing economies, these kind of reforms are attached as conditions of 
structural reforms programmes, underwritten by the IMF and World Bank The attempt to 
put these  reforms into practice has produced   varying results (Hood and Peters, 2004). 
What apparently binds all these reforms of the public sector,  the management of public 
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services and associated ideology is the promise of the end of bureaucracy, to be 
replaced by organisational variants of post-bureaucracy. 
  The process of “de-bureaucratization” appears to be quite central to the 
discourses of ‘Reinventing government’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992); ‘New Public 
Management’ (NPM) (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994, McLaughlin, Osborne and Ferlie, 
Pollitt, 2000); ‘Network Governance’ (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000);  and ‘Digital-Era  
Governance’ (Dunleavy, et al 2006) and “New Public Governance” (NPG) (Osborne 
2006) These concepts frequently share the  language  of entrepreneurship, functional 
decentralisation and quasi-markets, enabled by technological and organizational 
innovation, as in the  example of networks. The main question is,  ‘how can the 
reinventing of government and the adoption of  NPM’, in particular  be sustained if they 
are antithetical to a revival of civil society and its institutions as  well as  the restructuring 
of its relationship to the public domain?  NPG in this context, as a ‘softer’ version of 
NPM, is different in that it recognises the limits to market-driven reforms of the public 
sector and links governance structures back to a legitimate and accountable public 
domain.    The key issues are,  firstly, whether new organizational forms that develop 
actually can be characterized as post-bureaucratic. Secondly, that a restructuring of the 
public domain by implementing these processes in reality  leads to an extension of the 
bureaucratic form in the delivery of publicly provided or underwritten services. For the 
purpose of this paper, the discourses of public management reform listed above are 
collected together under the term ‘Transformed  Public Governance” (TPG): a catch-all 
term for recent  developments in public sector reform.  
Governance increasingly presents commentators with a dilemma. Its utility in 
describing the changing institutional nature of the state is unquestionable but the 
increasingly general and unquestioning use of the term tends to drain it of  conceptual 
and analytical relevance  (Newman 2001).   The distinction between government and 
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governance came to prominence in the analysis of corporatism and neo-corporatism3.  
From a political science perspective, government in democratic societies can be defined 
as the formal exercise of power and authority through the legitimate and accountable 
undertaking of  functional duties that are underpinned by financial resources of behalf of 
a constituency. Governance can be described as the informal attribution of power and 
authority to a set of institutions, agencies and/or actors who are incorporated into 
governmental relations by acting as intermediaries on behalf of government or its 
functional divisions. Governmental bodies and governance institutions both derive their 
legitimacy from their ability to deliver bargains on behalf of their respective 
constituencies, for example business associations and trade unions. The difference is 
that in the former case, the attribution of power is formal and the latter is informal. (Offe, 
1985).   In the public administration and public management literature, governance takes 
on a more nuanced hue. Kelly summarises this neatly; 
In the literature on public policy and administration the concept of governance 
now dominates contemporary debates ( Newman 2001 ). The concept is mostly 
used to explore the diminishing capacity of the state to direct policymaking and 
implementation, something also portrayed as ‘ hollowing out of the state ’ 
(Rhodes 1997 ). The term governance is also used to describe governing 
arrangements that are more than or greater than merely the institutions of 
government. Hence users of the term tend to focus on the rupture between the 
formal political institutions and the growth of governance arrangements – such as 
networks and partnerships – and the increasing use of deliberative forums for 
service users. (Kelly, 2006; 605). 
Public governance in this context is the delegation of powers and resources by 
public bodies to private and quasi-private agencies to manage and provide 
governmental functions and underlying services.  
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This paper reviews the conceptual background and frameworks underlying 
changing in public administration and public management under the rubric of TPG.. In 
particular, it reviews the debates about bureaucracy and post-bureaucracy  in the reform 
of Public Service Organisations (PSOs). Furthermore, it critically examines the tendency 
to conflate public administration with bureaucracy and public management reform with 
post-bureaucracy and the superiority of the latter over the former. Although these 
debates may seem arcane to policy makers and public managers, the adoption of 
apparently post-bureaucratic discourses and practices by these communities does bear 
directly on the operations of PSOs and the individuals whose work for them in  their day 
to day work activities. Within a policy setting of public sector reform  the discourses of 
TPG influence practice and outcomes. As stated above, post-bureaucracy has become a 
term that has almost become a clarion to practitioners to reform engage in organisational 
reform of  public services. By emulating private sector procedures  and organisational 
values,  these communities of practice ironically institute new or extended forms of 
bureaucracy: the central argument of this paper. Specifically, the replacement of public 
administered norms by contracts regulated by quasi-independent agencies creates 
different internal and external bureaucracies.  
 In the final section the possibilities of a re-constructed public domain, a revival in 
public values as one of the main drivers of public services within a wider setting of public 
governance is explored under the rubric of “Reanimated Public Governance (RPG)”.  We 
begin though by reviewing some of the debates subsequent to NPM. 
New Public  Governance  (NPG) or NPM with a Governance Face? 
A careful reading of the new and old variants of public administration and 
management suggest some convergence, thereby undermining claims for a new and 
discrete ideal-type of public governance.  If public governance is being reinvented, is 
NPM and its variants under the general rubric of TPG the driver for converging on this 
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new form?  In the case of NPM, Pollitt  makes a strong case for rejecting this hypothesis. 
In analysing NPM, he distinguishes four types of convergence from which a new ideal-
type could be constructed: “Discursive convergence”; “Decisional convergence”; 
“Practice convergence”; and   “Results convergence”   . (Pollitt, 2002). Pollitt finds  that 
there has a considerable degree convergence  for the first two in the OCED countries 
with limited convergence for  third and limited information on the outcome of the fourth .  
However, the evidence base tends to be impressionistic with the geographical 
distribution of  the embrace of NPM being very uneven, limited mainly to the Anglo-
Saxon countries (op.cit).  Pollitt’s taxonomy is useful in suggesting that the caricatured 
old and the lionised new are part of a continuum.  A similar taxonomy would be useful in 
assessing the opportunities for post-bureaucratic organizational forms and their 
trajectory in the public domain. 
     Taking up the apparent failures of public administration and restructured public 
governance , Osborne and others propose “New Public Governance (NPG)” as an 
alternative discourse to traditional public administration and NPM.  Drawing on 
organisational sociology and network theory, one proponent, Osborne   assumes a 
pluralist state and a plural state  within which public management has become 
increasingly uncertain and fragmented (Osborne, 2006). There is a pluralist perspective 
in the theory of the state literature  that views the state as a neutral referee between the 
competing demands of society, but a state logically cannot be plural or pluralist. 
Skelcher gives a better and  more precise account when he argues that government has 
becomes fragmented because of a congested state (Skelcher, 2005) . NPG examines 
inter-organisational relationships and their  effectiveness in public services delivery, 
subject to the efficacy of the governance processes that manage these relationships.  
        One can see that the network approach to public governance is attractive, 
particularly in the face of a more challenging environment in which public policy 
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operates, as described above.  It has become attractive in a number of social science 
disciplines, for example economics and geography (see Coriat 1995, Oliver  and 
Blakeborough,  1998 Saxenian, 1994).  The theoretical basis of network management 
comes from inter-governmental relations literature (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). It does 
have however have strong lineage in organisational sociology (Granovetter 1973,   Di 
Maggio and Powell 1983,  Nelson and Winters 1982  ). Its general appeal appears to lie 
its ability to navigate and make sense of a seemingly more complex and global world in 
which innovation and flexibility are the seen as key characteristics of the modern 
organisation, whether private or public. It does make an important connection to public 
management through organizational forms under ‘restructured  public governance’. Its 
relationship to NPM has been described as 
‘While ‘new public management’ represents an attempt to translate managerial 
ideas from the private sector to public organizations, such as contracting out, 
client orientation and the  introductions of market mechanisms, ‘network 
management’ focuses more on mediating and co-ordinating inter-organizational 
policy makin.’  (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000;136). 
Mapping patterns of relations between organizations and the influence of these patterns 
on policy making provides the focus for  examining restructured public governance . One 
can start to perceive how a network approach would be relevant to de-bureaucratization 
and prospects for post-bureaucratic organizational forms within public governance.   
Given that  there  is no single model of NPM, a network approach may provide a 
way by which more complex institutional interaction can be analysed. The enabling of 
institutional interaction around public policy  results in collaborative, co-operative and 
competitive policy games between and within networks (Klijn and Koppenajan, op.cit) . 
In an environment of restructured  public governance, these networks include 
sponsoring governmental departments and devolved delivery agencies (whether public, 
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private or non-profit) that operate flexibly rather than being rule-bound.  This further 
reinforces the perception that the management of networks and constituent policy 
games encourages the development of post-bureaucracy (Kljin and Koppenjan, 2000). 
   The adherents network governance and its variants overlook the difficulties of the 
managing  and delivering  of public services on the ground in regard to the need for 
standardisation and conforming to audited targets on the type and amount of outputs In 
a reformed public sector, the legacy of privatisation and marketisation, reinforces the 
need for regulatory oversight in the form of contracts, which are legacy enforceable.   
For example in New Zealand, a country in the forefront of NPM, the running of public 
services by private firms led to a dissatisfaction with the ensuing quality of services. The 
government then sued these  private firms, but this was rejected by the civil courts in 
New Zealand because there was no quality clauses put into the original contracts. The 
subsequent contracts that included quality clauses were too onerous in terms of 
transactions costs for private firms to bid for them (Lane, 2006).  
      Furthermore, as service providers become more decentralised from centrally 
determined policy making, network benefits become more stretched with a consequent 
tendency to instability and greater transactions costs.  Thus NPG appears to be the 
human face of NPM that also suffers from a degree of abstraction through, at times, its 
proponents’ enthusiastic adoption of network governance. The possibility of post-
bureaucracy being enabled in an NPG environment then falls at the fence of the need for 
bureaucratic safeguards from the legacy of NPM and the need for standardisation in 
public services and the regularity of their production.   
The Extension  of Public Bureaucracy?  
  Bureaucracy is often defended from the charges of being a narrowly hierarchical, 
standardised and inflexible organizational form (du Gay, 2000, 2001, de Lyn Jr 2001). A 
major challenge for bureaucracy and its defenders is how does it stand up to the 
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challenges of networked, virtual and partnership organizational forms which contain 
flexible working patterns and inclusiveness leading to the permeation of work into 
personal spheres and vice versa?  Proponents of post-bureaucracy suggest that 
changes in economy and society sound the death knell for the bureaucratic 
organizational form (Hecksher and Donnellan 1998). However, the claims of the 
management theory discourse that post-bureaucracy is inclusive of individuals in 
organizations, whereas bureaucracy is non-inclusive is questionable at a number of 
levels (Lane, 2000), including: 
‘For a decade, public administration and management literature has featured a 
riveting story: the transformation of the field’s orientation from an old paradigm to 
a new one. While many doubt claims concerning a new paradigm – a New Public 
Management – few question that there was an old one. An ingrained and 
narrowly focused pattern of thought: a “bureaucratic paradigm” is routinely 
attributed to public administrations’ traditional literature.  A careful reading of that 
literature reveals, however, that the bureaucratic paradigm is, at best , a 
caricature and, at worst, a demonstrable distortion of traditional thought that 
exhibited more respect for law, politics, citizens, than the new, customer 
orientated managerialism and its variants.’ (Lyn Jr, 2001: 144) 
The demand for flexibility within post-bureaucratic organizations suggests a 
greater absorption of the individual into the world of work, shifting between different roles 
and capacities.  In this context, personalities, social relations, and individual interests 
may become subjugated to the instrumental concerns of the organization: extending 
bureaucracy rather than replacing it (Maravelias, 2003). However, given the ideological 
push for modernisation of the provision of public services in most OECD countries 
expressed in the discourses and practices of TPG, has the funeral of public bureaucracy 
already taken place? The drivers of post-bureaucratic organisational forms are closely 
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associated with the advocates of TPG, particularly its NPM component. Their arguments 
stem from debates concerning the nature of public and merit goods. Public goods are 
those that one individual cannot prevent another from enjoying its benefits. The usual 
examples are street lighting and road maintenance.  Merit goods are those that society 
deems beneficial, but ones that the market would not supply in sufficient quantities. 
Examples normally cited include education and health. The provision of both types of 
good by the state is seen as the outcome of market failure. Supporters of NPM point out, 
however, that technological change allied to post-bureaucratic organisational reforms 
mean that in many instances potential market failure can be overcome (Kettl 2000).  
  What one can discern in the extension of the public domain, is a de-
institutionalization arising from embracing the discourses and practices of new forms of 
organisation centred on values of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship (in the 
broadest sense) in the first instance. Equally, with the introduction of quasi-markets in 
the allocation and management of publicly provided or underwritten services, one can 
detect the process of disintermediation. That is, the ability of users to directly access 
public services without using intermediary agencies. For example, access to walk-in 
health services like X-rays, rather than first going to one’s local doctor. However, 
deinstitutionalization in the public policy process and disintermediation in the 
management process cannot escape the need for standardization: one of the supposed 
key characteristics of bureaucracy. In particular, the need to sustain economies of scale 
in service provision reinforces standardization. For example, collective bargaining 
arrangements which establish pay and conditions are important in sustaining service 
continuity. Moreover, the ability to engage more creative and innovative ways of 
delivering and managing services rest on exploiting economies of scope. This 
exploitation rests on establishing a minimum scale of operations and not on post-
bureaucracy.  
 13
The penetration of private and non-profit agencies into the provision of public 
services rest on standardized contractual arrangements, conforming to audited targets 
as part of juridical conditions and being subject to arms-length governmental or 
governance regulation. In other words, as service provision extends away from 
traditional public administration so there is an extension of bureaucratic organization and 
not its replacement by post-bureaucratic organization. The need for minimum efficient 
scale (indivisibilities) reinforces this argument, especially standardization of service 
provision.  
The environment of re-structured public governance may lead to more creative, 
innovative and entrepreneurial means of managing particular services more effectively 
and generate operational efficiencies. However, these potential savings need to be 
offset against increased transactions costs arising from a more extended form of 
governance. Transactions costs are defined as “the costs of running the economic 
system”. (Arrow, 1969; 4).  Another consequence of transformed public governance is 
consolidation among private providers, through mergers and acquisitions,  as they seek 
to exploit economies of scale and scope by bidding for an increasingly number of 
contracts, spreading transactions and managerial costs across as much output as 
possible. Moreover, this enables these providers to exploit knowledge of one market in 
public service provision in order to bid for similar or associated service contracts, thereby 
lowering transactions costs.   
  The analysis of transaction costs depends on understanding the relation  
between the firm and the market and the role of relational contracts. There are two parts 
to the latter.  Firstly the ex ante  negotiation: setting out and laying down conditions for  
safeguarding an agreement. Secondly, dealing with  ex post outcomes whereby when 
transactions begin to move away from agreement, costs of adjusting to this drift are 
incurred. Furthermore bargaining costs result when bi-lateral negotiations are engaged 
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in situation where the ex post outcomes differ from ex ante agreements. Correcting this 
outcome incurs further bargaining costs.  Finally, there are set-up and running costs of 
the governance structures to oversee agreements, as well the costs that occur to secure 
future commitments and bind the participants into these structures. (Williamson, 1985). 
The outcome of all these changes has been the creation of global service 
companies who now monopolise this growing area of public services management and 
delivery. Examples include the engineering consultancy, W.S. Atkins in the UK, and the 
former engineering contractor, AMEC  in the US as well as large US consultancy and IT 
companies who dominate  the operation of certain public services around the world..   
Both the internal pressures (to the firm) to win and manage contracts and the external 
pressures of conforming to regulatory demands (from public agencies and the like) and 
standardized service standards reinforce the need for bureaucratic organizational forms: 
however flexible or extended. The conclusion to be drawn is that first order processes of 
de-institutionalization and disintermediation, enabled within a restructured public 
governance environment, lead to second order processes of re-institutionalization and 
re-intermediation.  That is, new sets of institutions are created to manage changes in the  
management and operation of  public services and a new range of intermediary 
agencies (including non-profit and private ones) in the delivery of those services. 
Post-Bureaucracy or Flexible Bureaucracy? 
Despite the embrace of the discourse and practice of NPM by many states and 
public organizations, there is an argument that there is not one single model of NPM 
(Hood and Dunleavy, 1994, Borins 2000, 2001). Furthermore, there are claims that it is 
either dead or outmoded (Dunleavy et al, 2005). Similarly, there is a counter-argument, 
which claims that there is an ideal-typical model of post-bureaucracy, (Heckscher and 
Donnellan1998). Unfortunately, the assertion that there is a symmetrical relationship 
between the two types of organizational forms, in some of the literature, does not really 
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stand up to scrutiny.  Rather, there is a much more of an asymmetrical relationship, 
reflecting a change in the social foundations of bureaucracy over time and the scale and 
circumstances in which post-bureaucracy may appear (Kallinkos, 2004).  Consequently, 
the opportunity to explore this asymmetry is rather more pregnant with possibilities than 
is often the case.  Figure 1 sets out the conventional view of the relationship between 
the two organizational forms in  the context of reforms to public services in Canada 
Figure 1 :  Bureaucratic Profiles 
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The purpose of  Kernaghan’s organizational profile is to be able to locate and 
compare different government departments and public agencies, within and between 
countries,  along the vector of  bureaucratic/post-bureaucratic transition.  Although a 
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useful device, its comparative static nature tends to reinforce a caricatured version of 
bureaucracy. To be fair to Kernaghan, his account recognises the dynamic nature of 
bureaucracy and its overlapping and non-discrete relationship to post-bureaucracy, and 
that he is attempting to trace functional divisions (education, health, etc) along a 
continuum.   
The importance of values has been central to writings on public administration for 
a cons
sty; integrity, 
• (corporate culture): innovation; creativity and continuous 
The tw o encourage a simple bifurcation between 
iderable period. The penetration of the private sector’s corporate culture and its 
associated values into public sector organizations in many OECD countries gathered 
pace from the 1980s onwards. Under the rubric of NPM, the language of markets and 
attempts to form quasi-markets in public service provision created an increasingly 
dominant discourse.   Within this discourse, two types of values (public administration 
and corporate culture)  began to merge so as to create a more customer or consumer-
focused service delivery in the public realm. These two types of value are: 
• Traditional public administration: public interest; service; hone
fairness and equity; 
Professional values 
improvement. (Kernaghan, 2004) 
o are not so separate, but d
bureaucracy and post-bureaucracy.  The reification of professional values can be seen 
part of an ideological process, in which adherence to professionalisation actually leads 
to politicization.  For example, the 1981 Local Government Planning and Finance Act 
seriously reduced the fiscal powers of local authorities in the UK.  In doing so, the first 
Thatcher administration undermined a source of political opposition.  The local authority 
Treasurers found themselves as gatekeepers between the demands of central 
government to post a legal budget and the political demands of their political masters 
(local councillors) to resist central government constraints on the local provision of public 
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services. The Treasurers established an association to share experiences which 
resulted in a greater perception of their political role as gatekeepers, but under the guise 
of professionalisation. (Rosenberg, 1989) 
Drawing on the Canadian experience, Kernaghan distinguishes public services 
values 
al values: integrity; fairness. 
le of law. 
Kernaghan, 2004) 
The and any division 
course of  post-
bureau
tability leads 
 
as:  
1. Ethic
2. Democratic values: impartiality; ru
3. Professional values: effectiveness; service. (
se values actually cut across organizational cultural contexts 
between bureaucratic public administration and supposedly post-bureaucratic corporate 
management. The logical conclusion is obvious, but at this stage the bureaucratic/post-
bureaucratic situation is a continuum and not an oppositional dipole.  
Once one starts to explore the realities behind the dis
cratic/transformed  public governance change one often finds little fundamental 
difference with much mainstream public administration, just some re-arranging of the 
organizational furniture, despite frequent and manifold initiatives That is not to say that 
the impact on these changes on the ground are not important. The effects can often be 
dramatic and costly as the search for efficiency generates greater transactions costs in 
order  to maintain some form of equity in the distribution of public services. 
   The issue of the management of risk and its relationship to accoun
us  to examine  trust.  Trust forms an important part of the discussion about post-NPM 
public sector reforms.  NPM reforms were described by Dunleavy and Hood (1994) as  
the shift from the guardianship of traditional public administration to the trusteeship of 
public management reform within a restructuring of  public governance (Dunleavy and 
Hood, 1994). The idea of trusteeship is closely related to theories of development. For 
the followers of the nineteenth century French philosopher, Saint-Simon, only those who 
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had the capacity to utilise land, labour and capital  in the interests of society should be 
“entrusted” with them.  In the development field, trusteeship rests on the distinction 
between immanent development (the spontaneous development as in the historical 
trajectory of capitalism) and intentional development (attempts to improve material 
conditions in response to the consequences of immanent development, for example, 
poverty and unemployment). In Europe, this trusteeship was exercised by states over 
their citizenry by means of policy making. In the colonies this was exercised by colonial 
states by their governing practices (Cowen and Shenton, 1996).  In the contemporary 
setting of re-invented or modern government, the delivery of public services is entrusted 
to expert providers who contract with the state to exercise management of resources in 
the public domain.  Perversely, in the NPM environment, this has  tended to be  
associated with a low trust environment, whereas the publicly administered, public 
service ethos of  civil servant guardianship tends to be associated with a higher trust 
environment, (see  Dunleavy and Hood, op.cit. for detailed arguments).  In a more 
explicit public sector context,   White and Hollingsworth analyse the issue of trust with 
regard to audit and proxy accountability, and  fiduciary duty, (Hollingsworth and White, 
1999)  
Trust and governance is central to any effective organisation. The key challenges 
for  agencies who have trusteeship bestowed upon them is still that of legitimacy and 
accountability. In traditional (and supposedly bureaucratic) public organizations, 
determined by democratic imperatives, the consistency of rules, duties and obligations 
creates legitimacy and accountability. For the new trustees, the degree to which risk is 
managed and distributed and the consistency of  conforming to network/partnership 
rules and procedures will determine the scale of legitimacy and accountability in service 
delivery.  However, the more that the demands of legitimacy and accountability are 
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conformed to, the less opportunity there is for post-bureaucratic organizational forms. 
For example:  
 ‘New structural arrangements are usually portrayed as fostering professional 
values like effectiveness and service. However, concern has arisen about the 
impact  of these arrangements and accountability. Particular concern is focused 
on the means whereby governments can ensure democratic accountability as 
more organizations are located at arm’s length from the political executive and 
towards the periphery of the public sector’. (Kernaghan, 2004: 98) 
Arm’s length’s management and accountability in the public sector is nothing new, 
particularly in the UK.  Successive government reports, White Papers and academic 
literature wrestled with this problem in nationalized industries  (NEDO, 1976, HMSO 
1978, Kay and Thompson, 1986). Privatization did not resolve this problem, in particular 
for the natural monopolies like utilities. Problems of management and accountability 
became absorbed in the rise of the audit or regulatory state, through pricing and 
behavioural constraints set by manifold regulatory agencies.   
As described above, the reification of professionalisaton has tended to lead to a 
process of politicization. There has also been a tendency to equate professionalisation 
with the vales of transformed  public governance.  In the same manner that bureaucracy 
has been caricatured as static, hierarchical and inflexible, so traditional public 
administration and its values are seen as antediluvian.  A similar caricature can be 
created in the brave new world of  innovative, flexible and customer-driven service 
imperatives that can only be conformed to by post-bureaucratic organizational forms 
within a restructured public governance framework. 
Bureaucracy is frequently associated with Kafkaesque visions of  powerful, rigid, 
hierarchical and standardised organizations, that correspond to the German sociologist 
Max Weber’s’ metaphor of “the iron cage”. Kallinkos notes: 
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‘The claim concerning the demise of bureaucracy has not been supported by the 
systematic investigation  of the organizational  and occupational order of 
modernity’. (Kallinkos, 2004; 14). 
In respect of the arguments surrounding the post bureaucratic project and the work of its 
adherents, he responds: 
‘The entrepreneurial and managerial critique of bureaucracy is based on an 
oversimplified and stylised images of the bureaucratic form of organization. Most 
significantly, such a critique is marked by an astonishingly naïve functionalism 
devoid of any historical awareness’.  (Kallinkos, 2004; 14). 
In a similar vein Paul du Gay makes some incisive remarks in his book  ‘In Praise 
of Bureaucracy’ (du Gay, 2000).  He castigates advocates of contemporary 
administrative reforms for claiming economy, efficiency and effectiveness are 
fundamentally the same. In any organizational context, the relationship between the 
three is complex. It is doubly so in the public domain where public managers are often 
led to believe that there are zero costs associated with market-led reforms. The real 
purpose of the advocates of reform is described by du Gay as: 
‘Of course, undermining the bureaucratic ethos is an avowed intention of 
contemporary reformers, but their understanding of ‘bureaucracy, like their 
concept of ‘efficiency’, leaves a lot to be desired. Rather than referring to a form 
of organization exhibiting many of the characteristics of classic ‘bureau’ 
contemporary reformers use ‘bureaucracy’ as a composite term for the defects of 
large organizations’ (du Gay, 2000: 106). 
  In the debates on post-bureaucracy, the transformative role of technology is 
given prominence. However, new information systems and associated ICT infrastructure 
is not necessarily the sufficient condition for post-bureaucracy. ICT systems and 
associated software operate on the basis of standardization. Moreover, modern 
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production systems and associated quality auditing arrangements function through 
standardization. Supply-chain management, Just-in-Time (JiT) and Total Quality 
Management (TQM), Customer Relationship Marketing systems (CRM) as well as 
ISO9000 are examples of standardization. Most of these systems are associated with 
flexible, entrepreneurial and proximity to market arrangements. It is clear, however, that 
standardization is not the exclusive preserve and sole measure of bureaucracy.  
     In the next section, a review of the possibilities of finding a way out is the present 
impasse in the discussion of public sector that includes an extension or bureaucracy in 
the context of re-animating public governance.  
The Prospects for Reanimated Public Governance (RPG) – A way out of the 
current impasse ? 
   The forgoing arguments suggest that in countries TPG has run its course. In the 
case one important component, NPM, Dunleavy et all offer the following observation:  
‘The ‘‘new public management’’ (NPM) wave in public sector organizational 
change was founded on themes of disaggregation, competition, and 
incentivization. Although its effects are still working through in countries new to 
NPM, this wave has now largely stalled or been reversed in some key ‘‘leading-
edge’’ countries. This ebbing chiefly reflects the cumulation of adverse indirect 
effects on citizens’ capacities for solving social problems because NPM has 
radically increased institutional and policy complexity. ‘(Dunleavy, Margetts, 
Bastow and Tinkler, 2005; 14) 
The inevitable question is where do we go to next, if restructured public governance has 
failed to fulfil its promise? Dunleavy et al suggest that we have moved into Digital-Era 
Governance (DEG)   
‘The aim of a coherent and self-conscious digital-era governance strategy would 
not just be to achieve a time-limited or one-off direct stimulus to social problem 
 22
solving like earlier management regime changes. It would also encompass 
opening up government to others and to itself, so as to create a radically less 
complex institutional and policy landscape, engineered for simplicity and 
automaticity in routine operations and for agility and responsiveness in service 
delivery and government’s monitoring of the risk environment. Digital-era 
changes inside the government machine would be closely meshed with and run 
strictly in parallel with increases in citizens’ autonomous capabilities for solving 
social problems. They would go with the grain of what civil society stakeholders 
are doing anyway, as the digital era unfolds further. For public managers the trick 
will be to help make it so’. (op.cit; 16) 
Relocating the strategic locus of PSOs’ activities within government is to be welcomed 
but there is a  danger however, that ICT- driven public services is embraced too readily 
without recourse to appropriate management structures and processes.  DEG and 
networked governance provides a “smoke and mirrors” solution to the problems of 
managing and delivery services within complex organisations which have powerful 
structures, whether bureaucratic or post-bureaucratic    
  As argued above, the evolution of transformed public governance held the 
promise of de-instiutionalisation and disintermediation through post-bureaucratic 
organizational forms.  In reality, we have witnessed processes of re-institutionalisation, 
re-intermediation and new bureaucratic forms  as different service providers and 
networks of  providers have had to correspond to new regulatory norms. The 
bureaucratic form of organisation now cuts across internal public and external, and  
private and non-profit bodies.  
 There is a more thoughtful and nuanced literature that goes beyond the dialectic 
of traditional public administration and NPM.  This literature explores the re-assertion of 
public values in public management (Bovaird, 2003, 2005, Stoker, 2006). Stoker builds 
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his perspective on the back of reviewing network governance, which is summarised by 
the following quote: 
“Without a more general theory of public administration for networked 
governance, public administrators and other actors are less able to characterize 
the nature of emerging systems in the management of public services and 
programs, much less to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of these 
changes.’ (Stoker,  2006; 41). 
In attempting to evaluate the quality of public governance, Bovaird reviews various 
indicators, models and methodologies drawn from around the world (Bovaird, 2003).  In 
a subsequent contribution he points to the increasing interest in different types of values; 
different types of policy-making process; different types of organization and stakeholder. 
In first case, he extends it beyond values to users of public services to include wider 
affected groups and social, environmental and political values. This case, along with the 
other two, is  likely to be set within a trust framework as the traditional constitutional 
‘checks and balances’ approach to public governance comes under stress. The trust 
framework is one in which stakeholders in public governance  are entrusted with 
participation rights so as to achieve a balance between civic virtue (public values) and 
the need to protect citizens from those seeking to exploit them (Bovaird, 2006).  
    Stoker’s and Bovaird’s interventions on public values appear to be part of the 
continuum of debates on public governance and public management reforms that RPG 
contributes to. The prospects for RPG rest on creating a relationship between 
trusteeship and professional discretion, which may help to bridge between the two types 
of values “Traditional public administration” and  “Professional values (corporate 
culture)”: described by Kernaghan, (op.cit). There is no logical reason why these 
apparently discrete sets of values cannot exist side by side within PSOs.  In Taylor and 
Kelly’s review of Lipsky’s theory of discretion of public professionals, they conclude that 
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it now has limited application in a transformed public governance environment.  But they 
do point out that that there is a degree of game-playing, which in part depends on 
exploiting professionals’ discretion, in order to operate in this new environment (Taylor 
and Kelly, 2006). Moreover, their analysis opens up the possibility of building on theories 
like  Lipsky’s and applying them to create RPG, particularly in an era when public policy 
increasingly cuts-across national and functional boundaries.   
  There is a paradox in that NPM tends to de-skill professionals with functional 
autonomy into gatekeepers. That is, whilst NPM has reduced capacity for discretion; 
practitioners are required to operate across networks using their discretion and 
leadership. One conclusion to be drawn is that in  the more complex world of policy 
making and managing and delivering public services,  enhancing the role of 
professionals is an important aspect of moving on from the present difficulties.  
    The challenge for RPG is to bestow trusteeship on internal and external agencies 
engaged with PSOs, through longer term stable relations rather than ad hoc contracting 
processes. The discretion of public professionals appears to be central to this process 
but in an era when their distinctive skill-base has been eroded how can discretion be re-
created and re-activated?. One possibility is the incorporation of their professional 
associations within the standardisation and regulation of services so that the shift from 
guardianship of public administration to trusteeship incorporates professionals more 
directly into these governance structures, underpinned by their subscription to the revival 
of public values.  
    Perversely attempts to match quantitative outputs to inputs within transformed public 
governance reinforce the arguments for RPG to some extent.  There are  some sterling 
attempts to measure productivity in public services (see O’Mahoney, 2005). They are 
bedevilled however by the nature of the public service provided. For example in 
education and health, the service is both an input and an output. The value-added thus 
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resides within the expertise of the service professionals. Logically the de-skilling of 
professionals and downgrading their discretion reduces this value-added. Similar 
arguments apply to much of the budgeting systems that have been put in place in PSOs 
to make these organisations more accountable. As Heclo and Wlidavsky’s classic study 
of central government budgetary processes showed, budgeting is a highly political 
process (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1963).  In more complex front-line PSOs, the need for 
scale and the existence of indivisibilities mean that accounting for every aspect of 
service is actually costly (in transactions costs terms) and frequently counter-productive. 
Moreover, it is in this area that transformed public management has been deemed most 
to fail. Recognising the failure of micro-management in PSOs is a starting point for 
reanimating public governance. But the other explicit recognition is that in a  changed 
local and global environment, public sector reform does not rest of appropriating post-
bureaucracy but extending and making more flexible  bureaucratic organisational forms. 
Concluding Remarks 
  In an era, when the power of the nation-state has been apparently evacuated, 
driven by the globalization, fiscal stress,  liberalization and privatization, demands for 
global governance have grown.  Within this environment, international policy makers 
have been seeking to ‘reinvent government’ (Carnerio, 1999) . A corollary of  the general 
acceptance of  this new global order is a restructuring of the management and delivery 
of publicly provided or underwritten services.  In the spaces between these vectors of 
development, one can perceive a number of localised trends, that coalesce around the 
concept of ‘reanimated public governance’.  New organizational forms of service delivery 
- virtual, partnership – have been enabled by socio-economic and technological change, 
which in turns have influenced organisational innovation. The greater penetration of the 
private realm into the public realm (at both individual and organizational levels) suggests 
that public services no longer have to be accessed through the intermediation of public 
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agencies. Rather, a process of distintermediation has been initiated, whereby a range of 
non-public agencies and actors directly provide and manage public services.  
    The actioning of new values of proximity to customer, creativity, innovation and 
entrepreneurship in the delivery of these services can only occur if post-bureaucratic 
organizational forms prevail in the view stated above. This view, however, stems from a 
limited and somewhat caricatured view of bureaucracy and its different forms.  
Moreover, despite the prospect of new service values materialising in public service 
delivery, conforming to standards and contractual obligations, the existence of 
indivisibilities and the need to exploit economies of scale and scope constrain the post-
bureaucratic promise. But this constraint opens up the possibility of reanimating public 
governance as both a discourse and practice of continuity.  This approach opens up a 
rich vein of material for future research agendas to mine. It also provides the basis for 
practitioners to re-appropriate some their professional territory through understanding 
the discourses which may underpin future reforms in the public services. 
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END NOTES 
                                                     
1 A term invented by the international economist , John Williamson, to describe the structural 
adjustment policies, promoted by the IMF and World Bank, backed by the US,  to change the 
development path of a number of economies, particularly in countries in Latin-America, Asia and 
Central and Eastern Europe.  The Washington Consensus seek to sustaining  the economic and 
financial orthodoxy of liberalisation and privatisation, monetary  and price stability, control of 
national budgets and eradicating government deficits in combination with a powerful commitment 
to open markets and free trade. 
2 The principal-agent problem is central to principal-agent theory. This theory comes from  
industrial economics and economics of strategy. It is often related  to behavioral studies of 
employer-contractor or employer-employee interactions, as well as organizational settings, but it 
can be applied to public and non-profit settings as well. In the context of NPM, the consumer of a 
service deals directly with the appointed or contracted agent of the overall provider or underwriter 
of the service (principal). However, the consumer is the  principal whose agent of service delivery 
is the contractor. In paying either through fees or through an insurance or tax system, the 
consumer is engaged in a principal-agent problem with the sponsoring governing department 
3 Corporatism is a development of interest-groups politics that is formalised by the participating 
groups having degrees of power attributed to them by the state. One the  most cited examples is 
the former West Germany whose system of economic management included price and wage 
setting by formal discussion between the employers association, the trades union association and 
central government. The legitimacy of these arrangements depended on the degree to which 
these associations could deliver the bargains made on behalf of their members with central 
government. There are weaker variants that are used described asb neo-corporatist. 
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